

PROPOSITION A

A PUBLIC SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE RISK STUDY

Examining the Cost, Risk and Consequences of Dallas' Public Safety Infrastructure Decisions

THE QUESTION

What conditions exist today, what risks do those conditions create, what does Proposition A propose to address, and what risk does Dallas continue to carry if those conditions remain unresolved?

\$443 Million | Five Public Safety Facility Projects

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About This Study

Dallas voters are being asked to consider a \$443 million investment in five public safety infrastructure projects. The size of that investment deserves serious scrutiny. This study approaches Proposition A from a risk-management perspective. Rather than beginning only with the question, 'Should Dallas spend \$443 million?' we begin with a different question: What conditions exist today, what risks do those conditions create, what does the proposed investment address, and what risk does Dallas continue to carry if those conditions remain unresolved?

Our purpose is not to suggest that every risk justifies every expenditure. It is to give Dallas residents a framework for evaluating both sides of the equation. Responsible risk management considers the price of mitigation, but it also considers the potential cost of accepting known risk. Throughout this study, we distinguish between documented Dallas conditions, research-supported risk implications, and questions that require additional information. Voters should examine the underlying materials, ask difficult questions, and reach informed conclusions for themselves.

How We Evaluated Proposition A

For each project, the study applies the same six questions. This structure is intended to keep the analysis disciplined and to separate what is documented from what must still be learned.

1. **WHAT DO WE KNOW?** What condition has Dallas actually documented?
2. **WHAT IS THE RISK?** What operational, financial, legal, security, continuity, workforce or public-safety exposure can reasonably result from that condition?
3. **WHAT DOES PROPOSITION A ADDRESS?** What specifically would the proposed project change?
4. **WHAT DOES IT COST?** What investment is being requested from Dallas taxpayers?
5. **WHAT IS THE COST OF DOING NOTHING?** What risk remains with the City if the deficiency is deferred?
6. **WHAT DON'T WE KNOW?** What additional information should voters and decision-makers reasonably request?

CREDIBILITY RULE

Documented Dallas conditions, research-supported risk implications, and reasonable inferences are not the same thing. This study identifies the difference and does not present an inference as a Dallas fact.

Price Is Not the Same as Cost

\$443 MILLION

PROPOSITION A HAS A PRICE.

That number deserves scrutiny. Responsible analysis, however, requires examining another number that is much more difficult to calculate: what does continued risk cost? Doing nothing does not erase a known condition. It means Dallas continues operating the existing system, maintaining workarounds, repairing failures, and carrying the operational exposure associated with the deficiency.

INVESTMENT / MITIGATION	RISK RETAINED / POTENTIAL COST
Modern training Secure evidence Resilient communications Adequate response capacity	Injuries and incidents Claims and litigation Operational failures Emergency repairs and workarounds Evidence loss or damage Deferred costs

THE PRINCIPLE

Doing nothing is not a zero-cost alternative. It is a decision to continue carrying the existing risk.

Executive Summary

Proposition A can be evaluated as more than a capital construction package. It is a municipal risk-management decision. The five projects address documented weaknesses in the physical systems behind police training, specialized police operations, evidence preservation, 911 and emergency coordination, and downtown fire-rescue capacity. The core policy question is not simply whether Dallas prefers newer buildings. It is whether the City is willing to continue carrying identifiable operational, legal, financial, continuity, security, workforce, and service-delivery risks created or amplified by facilities that are aging, constrained, at capacity, or below current operational needs.

The City's own Proposition A material frames the issue in terms of capacity, technology, security, and resiliency. The package totals \$443 million: \$82 million to complete the Law Enforcement Training Center, \$149 million for a specialized Public Safety Training Complex, \$150 million for evidence and property storage, \$40 million for 911 and emergency operations, and \$22 million to replace Fire Station No. 4.

Dallas source: Proposition A One Pager, lines 11-15, 16-27, 28-47, and 55-57.

The Seven Risk Categories

- Operational risk: inadequate facilities can limit how personnel train, store evidence, coordinate emergencies, or deploy apparatus.
- Legal and liability risk: training quality, decision-making, use of force, emergency driving, evidence integrity, and workplace conditions can all become components of claims, litigation, or regulatory scrutiny.
- Financial risk: preventable incidents, claims, overtime, outside training, emergency repairs, evidence loss, and deferred capital needs can create costs beyond construction itself.
- Continuity risk: 911 and emergency management must remain reliable during the very events that place the greatest stress on municipal systems.
- Security and evidentiary risk: critical property, firearms, vehicles, and evidence require capacity, environmental protection, security, and chain-of-custody integrity.
- Workforce risk: outdated facilities can affect safety, morale, recruitment, retention, training quality, and the ability to sustain 24/7 operations.
- Public-trust risk: when known deficiencies become visible only after a failure, the City may be asked why the condition was known but not corrected.

CENTRAL QUESTION

What risk is the City of Dallas continuing to accept if known public-safety infrastructure deficiencies remain unaddressed?

Documented conditions and proposed projects: Proposition A One Pager, lines 16-47.

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

Is the cost of mitigating these documented conditions reasonable when weighed against the operational, legal, financial, security, continuity and human consequences of continuing to carry them?

2. Police Training as Liability Prevention and Performance Control

The strongest risk-management case for police training is not that a new building automatically prevents lawsuits. It does not. The stronger and defensible argument is that training is one of the City's principal controls for reducing preventable error in high-risk police activities. Those activities include use of force, de-escalation, firearms decisions, emergency vehicle operations, crisis response, communication, tactics, and judgment under pressure.

Why this matters legally

Dallas already maintains a City Attorney litigation function that defends the City and its employees in personal-injury, property-damage, constitutional, civil-rights, and state-law tort claims, including allegations involving Dallas police officers. Training therefore sits upstream from categories of exposure the City already manages downstream through claims and litigation.

City of Dallas City Attorney, Litigation Division, Torts section: handles personal injury, property damage, constitutional/civil-rights and state-law tort claims, including allegations involving Dallas police officers.

Federal law also recognizes circumstances in which municipal training practices can become part of civil-rights litigation. The point for a City Manager is not to claim that a training complex will eliminate liability. It is that the City should be able to demonstrate deliberate, contemporary, documented training systems for foreseeable high-risk tasks.

Office of Justice Programs / NCJRS: Police Liability for Negligent Training Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 Actions.

Training can change measurable outcomes

Modern police training research gives the City a stronger basis than intuition alone. A rigorous evaluation of the Louisville Metro Police Department's ICAT de-escalation training found statistically significant reductions after implementation: 28 percent fewer use-of-force incidents, 26 percent fewer community-member injuries, and 36 percent fewer officer injuries. These results should not be presented as guaranteed Dallas savings, but they demonstrate that well-designed training can affect outcomes that carry human, operational, and financial consequences.

National Policing Institute / Engel et al. evaluation of Louisville Metro Police Department ICAT training; randomized controlled trial findings reported by NPI.

Firearms training

Firearms proficiency is not merely marksmanship. It includes judgment, target discrimination, backdrop awareness, movement, communication, decision thresholds, stress management, and the ability not to fire when force is not justified. A modern range and scenario environment allows repetitions under controlled conditions before an officer must make a consequential decision in public.

The Proposition A material states that Dallas lacks adequate modern facilities for specialized driving, firearms, and scenario-based training and that the current firearms range is extremely outdated. It proposes indoor and outdoor firearms training together with realistic scenario training at a 60-plus-acre complex.

Dallas source: Proposition A One Pager, lines 22-27.

Emergency vehicle operations

Police driving creates a different but equally serious exposure. Emergency response and pursuit decisions combine speed, policy, legal standards, roadway design, pedestrian and traffic hazards, vehicle dynamics, and judgment. The Office of Justice Programs has long treated comprehensive law-enforcement driver training as a means of reducing police vehicle crashes and officer injuries, and its model guidance explicitly incorporates the legal and liability principles governing emergency and non-emergency driving.

Scenario training and decision-making

Scenario training is the bridge between classroom knowledge and performance under pressure. The value is not theatrical realism for its own sake. The value is controlled exposure to ambiguity, time pressure, communication problems, rapidly changing threats, bystanders, crossfire concerns, crisis behavior, and policy choices. The more faithfully training can reproduce the cognitive demands of the street, the more opportunity supervisors and instructors have to identify errors before those errors occur in an uncontrolled environment.

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

What does Dallas expect from an officer making a firearms, emergency-driving or use-of-force decision under extreme pressure, and does the City's training infrastructure match that expectation?

3. The Cost of Not Training Well

Risk management requires attention to avoided loss as well as direct expenditure. Some benefits of training are difficult to convert into a guaranteed dollar figure, and this report deliberately avoids claiming a specific return on investment that Dallas data cannot yet prove. Nevertheless, the cost categories are real and can be measured.

- Claims, settlements, judgments, outside counsel, discovery, expert witnesses, and staff time associated with litigation.
- Workers' compensation and injury-related costs when officers are hurt.
- Medical and human costs when community members are injured.
- Vehicle damage, third-party property damage, and injury exposure arising from emergency driving.
- Overtime and backfill when personnel attend training or when injured personnel are unavailable.
- Travel, tuition, instructor, range, facility-rental, and logistical costs when required training cannot be efficiently delivered in-house.
- Recruitment and retention effects when training infrastructure does not match the expectations of a major modern department.
- Reputational and public-trust costs after preventable high-profile failures.

Dallas' FY 2025-26 budget describes the Police Academy and In-service Training function as providing a 36-week basic academy, year-round in-service training, weapons training, and annual weapons certifications. That scale matters: training is not an occasional event. It is a recurring operating requirement for a large department.

City of Dallas FY 2025-26 budget book, Dallas Police Department service descriptions.

A useful taxpayer question

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

What does Dallas currently spend managing preventable incidents, injuries, outside training, overtime, claims and litigation, and what portion of that exposure could better training help reduce?

4. Evidence and Property: A Case-Integrity and Security Risk

The evidence facility may be the clearest example of physical infrastructure becoming enterprise risk. The current facility dates to the 1940s, has reached storage capacity, has documented security and space limitations, has active roof leaks that risk damaging critical evidence, stores material more than 17 feet high in areas with roughly 18-foot ceilings, and is responsible for more than 200,000 firearms.

Dallas source: Proposition A One Pager, lines 28-34.

Why the risk extends beyond the building

- Case integrity: damaged, lost, contaminated, or inaccessible evidence can affect investigations and prosecutions.
- Chain of custody: overcrowding and fragmented storage increase the operational burden of maintaining controlled access and documented movement.
- Security: storing more than 200,000 firearms makes physical security a public-safety issue, not simply a warehouse-management issue.
- Environmental protection: an active roof leak is a direct threat to evidence that may be irreplaceable.
- Capacity: once storage reaches capacity, every additional item creates pressure on workflow, retrieval, segregation, and safe handling.
- Workforce safety: extremely high storage and outdated employee facilities are operational conditions that should be considered in workplace-risk planning.
- Reputational exposure: if critical evidence were damaged after known roof and capacity issues had been documented, the question would quickly become why the known condition was allowed to persist.

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

What is the acceptable level of risk when irreplaceable criminal evidence and more than 200,000 firearms are managed in a facility already identified as having capacity, security and environmental deficiencies?

5. 911 and Emergency Operations: Continuity of Government Under Stress

The 911/EOC component is easy to undersell if it is described only as moving operators out of a basement. A basement can sound protected to the public. The risk-management issue is larger: Dallas' current environment is identified as lacking modern technology, not meeting current industry standards, and having documented facility and working-condition concerns. The proposed project is expressly intended to strengthen reliability and continuity during emergencies.

Dallas source: Proposition A One Pager, lines 35-42.

Dallas' Emergency Operations Center coordinates City departments during emergencies, monitors and manages resources, establishes goals and priorities, and supports response and recovery for events ranging from severe weather to terrorism. At maximum readiness, the EOC fully activates, monitors primary and secondary incidents, assesses hazard effects, develops protective measures, and conducts senior-staff briefings.

City of Dallas Emergency Management and Crisis Response, Emergency Operations Center page.

The key concept: single-site dependency and continuity

The correct question is not whether City Hall is a strong building. The question is whether the City's critical emergency communications and coordination architecture provides the resilience, redundancy, technology, staffing environment, and continuity needed when Dallas itself is under stress. A modern EOC/911 environment should be evaluated as critical infrastructure.

Dallas OEM describes its mission in terms of preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, mitigation, and community resilience. That mission is directly aligned with the risk-management rationale for a facility designed around continuity of operations.

City of Dallas Office of Emergency Management, About Us.

What should be verified before making stronger claims

The available Proposition A material does not, by itself, establish that the existing center lacks specific backup generators, redundant telecommunications, cybersecurity controls, hardened construction, alternate routing, or flood/severe-weather protection. Those are appropriate due-diligence questions, but they should not be presented as current deficiencies without technical documentation.

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

What level of resilience should a city the size and complexity of Dallas require from the communications and emergency-management infrastructure it depends upon during its worst emergencies?

6. Fire Station No. 4: Capacity Risk in a Changing Downtown

Fire Station No. 4 has served downtown since 1953 and is identified as Dallas Fire-Rescue's highest-priority station for replacement. The existing property cannot accommodate the fifth apparatus bay identified as necessary for the downtown service area. The proposed replacement is a modern five-bay station.

Dallas source: Proposition A One Pager, lines 43-47.

This is not principally an argument that a 1953 building is aesthetically old. It is a capacity argument. Apparatus, staffing, equipment, response patterns, building density, high-rise development, traffic, special events, and downtown population have changed. If the identified operational need is a fifth bay and the property physically cannot provide it, the facility itself has become a constraint on service design.

Risk questions for Fire-Rescue leadership

- What apparatus or specialty capability is intended for the fifth bay?
- What operational limitation exists today because the bay cannot be added?
- How has the downtown service area changed since the current station opened?
- What response-time, coverage, staffing, maintenance, or mutual-aid implications are associated with the current constraint?
- What is the cost of continuing to operate, repair, and adapt the existing facility compared with replacement?

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

If Dallas Fire-Rescue has identified additional apparatus capacity as necessary for downtown and the existing property physically cannot accommodate it, what is the operational consequence of continuing with the existing facility?

7. Deferred Infrastructure Is a Risk Decision, Not a Neutral Decision

Doing nothing is often described as the zero-cost alternative. In infrastructure management, it rarely is. Deferral means the City continues operating the existing asset, maintaining it, repairing failures, managing workarounds, and carrying the operational exposure associated with the known deficiency. The precise financial cost of deferral must be calculated from Dallas data, but the risk-management principle is straightforward: postponement is a decision to retain the risk.

City materials presented in 2026 note that the public-safety needs inventory used in developing the 2024 General Obligation Bond Program included approximately \$727 million in police and fire facility needs, based on a 2017 facility condition assessment, and identifies the LETC, specialized training complex, 911/EOC, evidence/property functions, and Fire Station No. 4 as current priority projects for additional funding.

City of Dallas, Real Estate, Financial, and Debt Analysis and Plans, 2026.

Questions that convert the bond debate into risk analysis

- What is the annual cost to maintain each deficient facility in its current state?
- What emergency repairs or temporary fixes have been required during the last five years?
- What operational workarounds are currently used because the facility cannot support the mission directly?
- What outside training, travel, rentals, overtime, or backfill are attributable to training-facility limitations?
- What claims or incidents have involved training, driving, use of force, evidence handling, facility conditions, or emergency communications?
- Which risks are currently insured, self-insured, contractually transferred, or simply retained by the City?
- What is the consequence if a known deficiency fails during a high-consequence event?

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

If Dallas defers a known deficiency, what annual maintenance, workaround, operational and risk-retention costs continue, and when does deferral become more expensive than mitigation?

8. Proposition A Is Also a Workforce and Recruitment Issue

Facilities communicate organizational expectations. A department can tell recruits that it expects professionalism, judgment, physical readiness, technical proficiency, and continuous improvement, but the credibility of that message is affected by the environment in which those expectations are taught and reinforced.

The new Law Enforcement Training Center is already being developed as a partnership with UNT Dallas. City materials place the total LETC program budget at \$185 million and reported \$96.5 million in committed funding as of February 2026, with additional funding still required. The partnership also includes curriculum coordination around 21st-century policing topics.

City of Dallas memorandum, February 20, 2026, DPD Law Enforcement Training Center at UNT Dallas monthly update.

- **Recruitment:** candidates compare departments, facilities, technology, training quality, career development, and organizational culture.
- **Retention:** quality training and professional development are part of whether employees believe the organization invests in their success.
- **Instructor effectiveness:** purpose-built spaces can support consistent delivery, observation, remediation, and evaluation.
- **Interagency opportunity:** specialized facilities can create capacity for regional partnerships, joint exercises, and shared training.
- **Culture:** a modern academy can reinforce that sound judgment, de-escalation, fitness, technical competence, and accountability are core professional expectations.

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

If Dallas expects to recruit, train and retain personnel for a modern major-city public-safety mission, what standard should its training and workplace infrastructure meet?

9. What Proposition A Does Not Prove by Itself

A credible public risk study should be explicit about the limits of the evidence. Overstatement weakens the case. The following claims should not be made without additional Dallas-specific data:

- That Proposition A will save a specific dollar amount in lawsuits or settlements.
- That a new training facility will automatically reduce use of force by a specific percentage in Dallas.
- That the current 911/EOC lacks a particular redundancy, backup-power, cybersecurity, hardening, or telecommunications feature unless technical documentation confirms it.
- That every facility deficiency has already caused a documented service failure.
- That the bond is cost-free. Debt service and opportunity cost remain legitimate fiscal considerations.
- That newer buildings alone improve performance. Facilities are enabling infrastructure; curriculum, policy, supervision, staffing, maintenance, technology, and leadership determine whether the capability is used effectively.

WHY THIS MATTERS

A strong case does not require exaggeration. If a claim cannot be supported by Dallas-specific evidence or credible research, voters should not be asked to treat it as established fact.

10. Questions Proponents Should Be Willing to Answer

A \$443 million public investment should withstand difficult questions. These are not opposition questions. They are taxpayer questions, and supporters of the proposition should be comfortable asking and answering them.

- How were the \$443 million project costs developed, and what contingencies are included?
- What controls will be used to prevent or manage cost overruns?
- What alternatives, including renovation or phased approaches, were evaluated for each project?
- Which portions of each project are essential to mitigating documented risk, and which are desirable enhancements?
- What happens if construction costs materially increase?
- What measurable outcomes will demonstrate that the investments improved public-safety capability?
- Can Dallas establish pre-opening baselines for use of force, injuries, emergency-vehicle collisions, training throughput, evidence retrieval, facility downtime, 911 continuity and fire-response capacity?
- What specific current industry standards does the existing 911/EOC environment fail to meet?
- What exact operational capability requires Fire Station No. 4 to have an additional apparatus bay?
- What are the annual maintenance, emergency-repair, outside-training, rental, overtime and workaround costs associated with the current facilities?

THE VOTER'S QUESTION

Are voters being given enough information to compare the price of the proposed mitigation with the cost and consequence of retaining the existing risk?

11. What Would Change Our Assessment?

Risk analysis should change when the evidence changes. This study should not be treated as a defense of a predetermined conclusion. New information can strengthen, weaken or materially alter the assessment of any project.

- Documentation showing that a cited facility deficiency has already been corrected or materially reduced.
- Evidence that a proposed project would not meaningfully mitigate the risk identified in this study.
- A material change in project scope, financing, cost, or debt-service assumptions.
- A credible lower-cost alternative that provides comparable risk reduction and operational capability.
- New technical documentation regarding 911/EOC resilience, evidence security, training capacity, or Fire Station No. 4 operational requirements.
- Post-project performance data that shows whether the promised capability and risk reduction were actually achieved.

PUBLIC COMMITMENT

If new evidence changes the risk picture, the assessment should change with it. That is not inconsistency. It is responsible analysis.

12. The Decision Belongs to Dallas

Proposition A asks Dallas taxpayers to authorize a substantial investment. \$443 million should never be treated casually. Neither should known public-safety risk.

The responsible question is not simply whether Dallas can afford to make these investments, nor is it simply whether the projects would be beneficial. The more complete question is whether the cost of mitigating these documented risks is reasonable when weighed against the operational, legal, financial, security, continuity and human consequences of continuing to carry them.

That is ultimately a judgment each voter must make.

**KNOW THE CONDITION. UNDERSTAND THE RISK.
EXAMINE THE PROPOSED SOLUTION. QUESTION THE COST.
CONSIDER THE COST OF DOING NOTHING. THEN DECIDE.**

DON'T TAKE OUR WORD FOR IT

Read the source documents. Check the facts. Ask the questions.

Appendix A: Project and Risk Summary

Appendix B: Principal Sources

- City of Dallas, Proposition A - Public Safety Facilities, \$443 Million for Five Public Safety Facility Projects (working one-page summary supplied for this project).
- City of Dallas, February 20, 2026 memorandum: Dallas Police Department Law Enforcement Training Center at the University of North Texas at Dallas Monthly Update.
- City of Dallas, FY 2025-26 Proposed Annual Operating and Capital Budget, Dallas Police Department service descriptions.
- City of Dallas, Emergency Management and Crisis Response, Emergency Operations Center.
- City of Dallas, Office of Emergency Management, About Us.
- City of Dallas, City Attorney's Office, Litigation Division.
- City of Dallas, Real Estate, Financial, and Debt Analysis and Plans, 2026.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Law Enforcement De-escalation Training Act resources and National Standards for Law Enforcement De-escalation Training.
- National Policing Institute, evaluation and research summaries concerning ICAT de-escalation training and use-of-force/injury outcomes.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs / NCJRS, Guidelines for the Evaluation and Structuring of a Driver Training Process for Law Enforcement Personnel.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs / NCJRS, Police Liability for Negligent Training Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 Actions.

END OF STUDY

RISK-MANAGEMENT THESIS

A city cannot eliminate public-safety risk. It can decide whether known risk will be accepted, transferred, mitigated, or reduced. Proposition A is principally a proposal to reduce or mitigate known infrastructure-

related risk.

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